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development. Inasmuch as this case may represent a return to
what appears to be a sounder basis for the examination of car-
ried interest cases, as well as a step in the direction of expressly
overturning the Abercrombie and Prater rule, it is a welcome
addition to the growing body of carried interest jurisprudence.
Moreover, it furnishes a stepping stone for the eventual adoption
of a pattern of analytical consistency and evenhanded tax treat-
ment based upon the placement of economic interest as revealed
by the actions of the parties rather than as dictated by technical
construction of the instruments employed in setting up a given
transaction.
George M. Sneflings III
TORTS - INJURED TORTFEASOR CANNOT SUCCEED TO CAUSE OF
ACTION AGAINST LIABILITY INSURER
A husband, injured through his wife's negligent driving, sued
her liability insurer under the Direct Action Statute for damages
for personal injuries. At the trial the insurance company admit-
ted the wife's negligence. After trial, but before judgment was
rendered, the husband died from causes unrelated to the acci-
dent. His widow, his succession representative, and his major
daughter each moved to be substituted as party plaintiff. The
trial court's decision that the admission of negligence operated
to make the action a heritable property right' was rejected by
the court of appeal, which concluded that the proper party plain-
tiff was the surviving widow under Revised Civil Code Article
2315 as amended in 1948.2 The court of appeal held further that
1. The trial court reasoned that the judicial admission of negligence was an
admission of indebtedness. Therefore, the action was converted into a property
right even though the amount had not been judicially determined.
The opinion of the court of appeal, reported at 125 So. 2d 12 (La. App. 8d
Cir. 1960), rejected the argument that the trial court's decision was supported by
Article 2291 of the Louisiana Civil Code, which provides that a judicial confes-
sion is full proof against the party making it. The court of appeal pointed out
that this article relates merely to the obligation of proof. Since the admission was
only of negligence and not of liability or indebtedness, no property right was vested
at that point in the proceedings. The Louisiana Supreme Court agreed with this
view. See 134 So. 2d 45, 47, 48 (La. 1961).
2. At the time of the accident in the instant case this article read in part as
follows: "Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another, obliges him
by whose fault it happened to repair it; the right of this action shall survive in
case of death in favor of the children, including adopted children and children
given in adoption, or spouse of the deceased, or either of them, and in default of
these in favor of the surviving father and mother or either of them, and in default
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the wife's negligence did not bar her recovery since the action
was a survival action as distinguished from an action for wrong-
ful death.8 On certiorari, the Louisiana Supreme Court held,
reversed and dismissed. A direct action against a liability in-
surer is dependent upon the cause of action against the insured.'
While the surviving widow is the proper substitute party plain-
tiff, she sues not merely as a representative of the deceased, but
in her own right as well. She may not recover because the policy
of the law does not permit one to benefit from his own miscon-
duct. Moreover, the cause of action was extinguished by the doc-
trine of confusion when the surviving widow became plaintiff as
well as tortfeasor. Dumas v. United States Fidelity and Guar-
anty Co., 134 So. 2d 45 (La. 1961).
Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315 allows recovery for two
types of actions. One type, commonly called a survival action, is
for damages sustained by the deceased for which he could have
recovered had he lived. The other is for damages to survivors
occasioned by the decedent's death, generally known as a wrong-
ful death action.5 In several decisions they have been considered
as separate and distinct causes of action." A release by the in-
of any of the above persons, then in favor of the surviving blood brothers and
sisters, or either of them, for the space of one year from the death. However,
should the deceased leave a surviving spouse, together with minor children, the
right of action shall accrue to both the surviving spouse and the minor children.
The right of action shall accrue to the major children only in those cases where
there is no surviving spouse or minor child or children.
"The survivors above mentioned may also recover the damages sustained by
them by the death of the parent or child or husband or wife or brothers or sisters
or adoptive parent, or parents, or adopted person, as the case may be. (As amend-
ed by Acts 1948, No. 333, § 1.)" (Emphasis added.)
3. The court of appeal found that the widow's negligence was immaterial since
the suit involved a "survival action" rather than a "wrongful death action." The
opinion stated at 125 So. 2d 12, 19: "This is the action of John Stanley Dumas
to recover damages for suffering, disability, medical expenses and loss of earnings.
The case stands or falls on his entitlement to damages and not on the entitlement
of the substituted party plaintiff."
4. The confusion argument was not presented to the trial court nor to the court
of appeal, but was first raised in a brief to the Supreme Court. Confusion is an
affirmative defense and ordinarily must be specially pleaded. See LA. CIVIL CODE
art. 2130 (1870) ; LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 327 (1870) ; LA. CODE or Civn
PnocEDuRE art. 1005 (1960). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the con-
fusion argument was properly before the court because it was met without ob-
jection and defended fully when presented.
5. For the text of Article 2315 see note 2 supra. For further discussion of
the effect of Article 2315 upon abatement of actions, see McMahon, Legislation
Affecting Courts and Judicial Procedure, 15 LOUISIANA LAW R vIEw 38 (1954) ;
Oppenheim, The Survival of Tort Actions and the Action for Wrongful Death-
A Survey and a Proposal, 16 TUL. L. REv. 386 (1942) ; Snellings, Certain Aspects
of Heritable Obligations, 30 TuT. L. RaV. 305 (1956) ; Comment, 15 LOUIsIANA
LAw Rzviaw 722 (1955).
6. Dougherty v. New Orleans Ry., 133 La. 993, 63 So. 493 (1913) ; Wester-
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jured party does not bar a wrongful death action by his sur-
vivors. 7 Furthermore, a judgment obtained in a suit by the in-
jured party while living does not preclude a subsequent wrongful
death action by the survivors should he later succumb to the
injuries." However, it has been held that all survivors may be
required to assert their claims for both types of damages in one
suit.9 While it is settled that contributory negligence of a sur-
vivor will bar his recovery in a wrongful death action,' no de-
finitive holding in Louisiana prior to the instant case has been
found on the question of whether a survivor's negligence will
bar his recovery in a survival action." It is well settled that
negligence of the deceased injured party will bar recovery in
both types of actions under Article 2315.12
If an injured party obtains a judgment before death, the
judgment passes to his heirs or legatees as part of his succession
rather than to the survivors designated by Article 2315.18 But
before a judgment is rendered in favor of the injured party, sur-
vival of the tort action is governed by Article 2315.14
field v. Levis Bros., 43 La. Ann. 63, 9 So. 52 (1891) ; Johnson v. Sundbery, 150
So. 299 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1933). See dicta in Dowell, Inc. v. Jowers, 166 F.2d
214, 219 (5th Cir. 1948).
7. Johnson v. Sundbery, 150 So. 299 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1933).
8. Dougherty v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 133 La. 993, 63 So. 493 (1913).
9. Norton v. Crescent City Ice Mfg. Co., 178 La. 135, 150 So. 855 (1933);
Reed v. Warren, 172 La. 1082, 136 So. 59 (1931) ; Davies v. Consolidated Under-
writers, 14 So. 2d 494 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1943). Language in these cases is clearly
to the effect that Article 2315 creates only one cause of action. It is submitted,
however, that application of these cases should be restricted to situations where
it is desirable to avoid a multiplicity of suits.
10. Majors v. Allen Mfg. Co., 144 La. 314, 80 So. 549 (1919); Wise v.
Eubanks, 159 So. 161 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935); Richmond, F. & P. R.R. v.
Martin's Adm'r, 102 Va. 201, 45 S.E. 894 (1903).
11. In Westerfield v. Levis Bros., 43 La. Ann. 63, 9 So. 52 (1891), parents
brought a wrongful death action for the death of their son and also claimed dam-
ages for his suffering. The court considered the defense of contributory negligence
of the plaintiffs in deciding the wrongful death issue but did not mention contrib-
utory negligence in deciding whether the parents could recover for the suffering
of their child. This indicates that contributory negligence of survivors is not a
defense to a survival action, but it is not authority for the proposition because
the court found the plaintiffs not to have been contributorily negligent and al-
lowed recovery for both types of damages. Cf. Olivier v. Transcontinental Ins. Co.,
93 So. 2d 701 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1957); Kientz v. Charles Dennery, Inc., 17
So. 2d 506 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1944). For the rule in other jurisdictions see
Kuehn v. Jenkins, 251 Iowa 718, 100 N.W.2d 610 (1960) ; Crevelli v. Chicago,
Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 98 Wash. 42, 167 Pac. 66 (1917) ; Potter v. Potter,
224 Wis. 251, 272 N.W. 34 (1937) ; Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d 785 (1948).
12. Vitale v. Checker Cab Co., 166 La. 527, 117 So. 579 (1928).
13. Castelluccio v. Cloverland Dairy Products, Inc., 165 La. 606, 115 So. 796
(1927) ; Foy v. Little, 197 So. 313 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1940) ; Williams v. Camp-
bell, 185 So. 683 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939).
14. McConnell v. Webb, 226 La. 385, 76 So. 2d 405 (1954) ; Payne v. George-
town Lumber Co., 117 La. 983, 42 So. 475 (1906).
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The Louisiana Direct Action Statute allows an injured person
to sue the tortfeasor's liability insurer without first obtaining
judgment against the tortfeasor or joining him as a party de-
fendant.15 Since a suit under the Direct Action Statute must be
based upon a cause of action against the insured, the insurer
may urge general defenses relating to the cause of action such as
lack of negligence, contributory negligence, prescription, and
confusion.16 However, defenses personal to the insured, such as
interspousal or governmental immunity, are not available to the
insurer.'7 This result has been justified by reasoning that the
cause of action against the insurer is dependent upon a cause of
action against the insured, but that rights of action against the
insurer and the insured are not the same.' 8 For purposes of fed-
eral diversity jurisdiction an action under the Direct Action
Statute is separate and distinct from an action against the in-
sured.19 Thus the fact that the injured party and the insured are
residents of the same state does not destroy diversity jurisdic-
tion between the injured party and a non-resident insurer.
In the instant case the court agreed with the court of appeal
that survival of a tort action not reduced to judgment is gov-
erned by Article 2315 rather than by the laws of inheritance.
20
This presented the court with the choice of either allowing a
survivor to recover for damages occasioned by her own negli-
gence or of granting the insurer a windfall because the injured
party died before obtaining judgment. Citing the maxim that
one should not benefit from his own misconduct, the court chose
15. LA. R.S. 22:655 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1958, No. 125. For a re-
cent discussion of the Direct Action Statute see Comment, 22 LOUIsIANA LAW
REVIEW 243 (1961).
16. Emmco Ins. Co. v. Globe Indem. Co., 237 La. 286, 111 So. 2d 115 (1959)
Hidalgo v. Dupuy, 122 So. 2d 639 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960) ; Addison v. Employers
Mut. Liab. Co., 64 So. 2d 484 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1953) ; Rome v. London & Lanca-
shire Indemnity Co., 169 So. 132 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1936).
17. Ruiz v. Clancy, 182 La. 935, 162 So. 734 (1935) ; Edwards v. Royal
Indem. Co., 182 La. 171, 161 So. 191 (1935) ; Rice v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co.,
114 So. 2d 92 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959) ; McDowell v. National Sur. Corp., 68
So. 2d 189 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1953) ; Chapman v. Travelers Indem. Co., 45 So. 2d
557 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1950) ; Rome v. London & Lancashire Indem. Co., 169
So. 132 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1936) ; Stamos v. Standard Ace. Ins. Co., 119 F.
Supp. 245 (W.D. La. 1954).
18. Addison v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 64 So. 2d 484 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1953).
19. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48 (1954).
20. The Louisiana Supreme Court did not dwell at length on this issue: "Ob-
viously, in view of the explicit provisions of the law, the rights of the heirs or
the succession representative of the deceased injured party can only come into
being if the right of the beneficiary designated by Article 2315 does not exist at
the date of death- that is, when the decedent's right of action has been reduced
to judgment." 134 So. 2d 45, 48 (La. 1961).
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the latter. It is clear that liability insurance covers the risk of
liability to the insured's spouse ;21 therefore, the court's decision
in this case allowed the insurer to profit by the injured party's
death. Characterizing the survivor under Article 2315 as a
plaintiff in her own right and not merely a representative of the
injured party,22 the court reasoned further that confusion ex-
tinguished the cause of action when the surviving widow became
plaintiff as well as tortfeasor. Confusion is a doctrine, normally
applied to conventional obligations, and extinguishes an obliga-
tion when the qualities of debtor and creditor are united in the
same person.23 The court found that the insurer was released
because liability insurance partakes of the nature of surety-
ship.24 On rehearing, the court bolstered its position on confu-
sion by concluding that whether or not a liability insurer is
analogous to a surety, the cause of action against the insurer
was extinguished along with the cause of action against the in-
sured because a direct action is dependent upon the existence of
a cause of action against the insured.25
As a result of the instant case, it appears that negligence of
a survivor will preclude recovery by him in a survival action as
well as in an action for wrongful death. The court did not ex-
plain why a substitute party plaintiff of a survival action should
not be considered merely a representative of the injured party.
One state has justified a similar result by reasoning that statu-
tory survival actions are not mere continuations of an injured
21. Ruiz v. Clancy, 182 La. 935, 162 So. 734 (1935) ; Edwards v. Royal
Indem. Co., 182 La. 171, 161 So. 191 (1935) ; McDowell v. National Sur. Corp.,
68 So. 2d 189 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1953); Chapman v. Travelers Indem. Co., 45
So. 2d 557 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1950).
22. The court did not concern itself with a detailed analysis of this issue. It
dismissed the opinion of the court of appeal with the following statement: "We
cannot subscribe to this reasoning as it fails to properly assess the realities of
the case. Mrs. Dumas is not suing in a representative capacity. She is seeking to
recover damage for her own account, by virtue of her survivorship of the right of
action of her deceased husband, for the personal injuries he sustained as a result
of her own negligence." 134 So. 2d 45, 49 (La. 1961).
23. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2217 (1870) : "When the qualities of debtor and
creditor are united in the same person, there arises a confusion of right, which
extinguishes the obligation."
24. Id. art. 2218: "The confusion that takes place in the person of the prin-
cipal debtor, avails his sureties." Id. art. 3035 defines suretyship. The court
realized that its analogy between liability insurance and suretyship was not
sound in all respects, but it pointed to several cases holding that the analogy was
sufficiently sound to prohibit insurers from urging defenses personal to the in-
sured. Id. arts. 3056, 3060; 134 So. 2d 45, 50, 52 (La. 1961).25. 134 So. 2d 45,,52 (La. 1961). In response to an attack upon its conclu-
sion that a liability, insurer: is a surety, the court said that the cause, of action
against the insurer was extinguished when the cause of action against the insured
was extinguished under LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2217 (1870)..
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party's action but are new causes of action, an essential element
of which is the death of the injured party.2  It is submitted,
however, that Article 2315 was intended to transfer the injured
party's original cause of action to the designated survivors. Thus
recovery under a survival action should be based on whether or
not the injured party could have recovered had he lived, irre-
spective of any defenses against the survivors.
It is submitted that the principle that one should not profit
from his own misconduct seems harsh when applied to a situa-
tion such as the instant case involving no willful misconduct or
gross negligence. Also, it leads to rather anomalous results be-
cause had the injured party obtained judgment in his favor be-
fore death, the judgment would have been community property.27
Since the events giving rise to the instant case, Article 2315
has been amended. The injured party's major daughter in the
instant case would now be a proper party plaintiff along with
the surviving widow. 28 No Louisiana cases have been found indi-
cating the allocation of recovery among survivors when a co-
survivor under Article 2315 is precluded from recovery. There
has also been little development on this question in other states
26. Crevelli v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 98 Wash. 42, 167 Pac. 66
(1917). This distinction was recognized in Kuehn v. Jenkins, 251 Iowa 718, 100
N.W.2d 610 (1960). See Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d 785, 811 (1948).
27. LA. CIviL CODE arts. 2334, 2402 (1870). McHenry v. American Em-
ployers' Ins. Co., 206 La. 70, 18 So.2d 656 (1944).
28. "Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him
by whose fault it happened to repair it.
"The right to recover damages to property caused by an offense or quasi
offense is a property right which, on the death of the obligee, is inherited by his
legal, instituted, or irregular heirs, subject to the community rights of the sur-
viving spouse.
"The right to recover all other damages caused by an offense or quasi offense,
if the injured person dies, shall survive for a period of one year from the death
of the deceased in favor of: (1) the surviving spouse and child or children of the
deceased, or either such spouse or such child or children; (2) the surviving father
and mother of the deceased, or either of them, if he left no spouse or child sur-
viving; and (3) the surviving brothers and sisters of the deceased, or any of
them, if he left no spouse, child, or parent surviving. The survivors in whose
favor this right of action survives may also recover the damages which they
sustained through the wrongful death of the deceased. A right to recover dam-
ages under the provisions of this paragraph is a property right which, on the
death of the survivor in whose favor the right of action survived, is inherited by
his legal, instituted, or irregular heirs, whether suit has been instituted thereon
by the survivor or not.
"As used in this article, the words 'child,' 'brother,' 'sister,' 'father,' and
'mother' include a child, brother, sister, father, and mother, by adoption, respec-
tively." (As amended Acts 1960, No. 30, § 1.) (Emphasis added.)
Although this amendment made a tort action for property damages a prop-
erty right, an action for personal injuries is not a property right. However, an
action for personal injuries does survive in favor of the designated beneficiaries.
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concerning survival actions. 29 However, the great weight of
authority in other states concerning wrongful death situations
is that negligence of a co-survivor should neither increase nor
decrease recovery by non-negligent survivors.80
Robert A. Hawthorne, Jr.
So the instant case would be applicable under the article as amended except with
the modification as discussed in the text above.
29. This can be explained by the fact that in most other states a deceased
injured party's estate is the proper substitute party plaintiff and contributory
negligence of the ultimate beneficiaries does not affect recovery. See Annot.,
2 A.L.R.2d 785, 811-14 (1948).
30. See Wettach, Wrongful Death and Contributory Negligence, 16 N.C.L.
Rzv. 211, 219-31 (1938) ; Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d 785 (1948).
